1. Their solvency advocate concedes a massive alternative causality that the plan cannot overcome. Strict ceilings on immigration undermineUSleadership—and such restrictions have only gotten worse since Bush has come to office. Peters ’97 (Phillip, vice president of the Lexington Institute, May 28, journal of commerce, “US miserly refugee policy, lexis)
But the current global conditions call more than ever for American leadership on refugees – leadership that is undermined by the administration’s cuts. The Clintonadministration’s reduced ceilings may allow enough room for groups that have long been of interest to the United States – Iraqi Kurds, Indo Chinese, victims of religious persecution in the former Soviet Union. Bu they will reduce overall US admissions, and they will likely impedeAmerica’s ability to enlist greater international cooperation in other crises.
2. All their US leadership evidence is at least 10 years old and is assumptive of a time when the United States still retained great credibility and influence in the world—since then, we invaded Iraq, tortured some people, and refused to ratify things like Kyoto—the world no longer looks to the United States for leadership on such issues.
<also, insert soft power alternate causality cards>
3. Malignant effects of camps on host countries makes resentment inevitable Feldman ‘7 (Sara J., Migration and Refugee Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Development Assisted Integration,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, VOLUME X X I I – 2 0 0 7)
Refugee camps also have a number of negative effects on the host governments that house them. Since they are expensive to build and maintain and are usually destroyed after the refugees leave, camps are a waste of scarce international aid. With respect to security, camps have, in a few instances, become bases for military opposition activity and enclaves of political ferment, though usually only if the refugees’ home country has a history of conflict with the host country. The maintenance of camps also places a financial and political burden on host states, a burden that is not adequately shouldered by the international community once the emergency phase isover.
4. Camps fail—refugees are left unable to rejoin the economy or farm—this makes resentment inevitable Feldman ‘7 (Sara J., Migration and Refugee Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Development Assisted Integration,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, VOLUME X X I I – 2 0 0 7)
Many refugees in camps are severely limited in their ability to move freely in and out of the camp, especially to travel longer distances. Camp populations are often isolated from economic opportunities and dependent upon humanitarian aid for survival. This can have drastic consequences, and can lead to hunger and malnutrition from shortages in needed supplies once the emergency phase of the crisis has ended. In the early stages of a refugee emergency, basic supplies and services are usually plentiful, or at least sufficient to meet the refugees’ needs. However, after the emergency phase of a refugee situation is over, humanitarian aid often drops off significantly. Since refugee assistance donations are voluntary in the UN system, the less visible situations naturally receive less assistance. The restriction on movement also keeps refugees from responding to the pull of the labor market on a national scale, preventing those with demanded skills from migrating to areas of the country where they would best be able to employ them while contributing to the local economy.15 As camps are often allocated the least productive land and are located far from centers of economic activity, opportunities for generating income or sustaining oneself without traveling some distance can be quite limited.
5. Political factors involving host countries make success of camps impossible—this extends refugee presence Feldman ‘7 (Sara J., Migration and Refugee Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Development Assisted Integration,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, VOLUME X X I I – 2 0 0 7)
Despite UNHCR’s apparent financial investment in and commitment to host country integration programs, which sought refugee self-sufficiency in the 1960s and 1970s, this effort was largely unsuccessful. Most organized settlements were unable to achieve or sustain economic self-sufficiency, and most refugees were not integrated into their host countries. According to Barry Stein, the most significant obstacles to their success have been “political factors involving the host country’s view of refugee settlements which impede the achievement of self-sufficiency, make it difficult to maintain if it is achieved, and which prevent the refugees’ political and social integration into the host country.”45 Of the 117 settlements established inAfricabetween 1961 and 1979, 85 were still operating by 1982. Of those that were no longer operating, 21 were closed due to repatriation (with 7 being declared selfsufficient before being closed) and 11 were abandoned. Of the 85 still operating, 30 had been declared self-sufficient, 21 of which had received renewed aid, while 55 were not declared self-sufficient by 1982.46
1. Their solvency advocate concedes a massive alternative causality that the plan cannot overcome. Strict ceilings on immigration undermine US leadership—and such restrictions have only gotten worse since Bush has come to office.
Peters ’97 (Phillip, vice president of the Lexington Institute, May 28, journal of commerce, “US miserly refugee policy, lexis)
But the current global conditions call more than ever for American leadership on refugees – leadership that is undermined by the administration’s cuts. The Clinton administration’s reduced ceilings may allow enough room for groups that have long been of interest to the United States – Iraqi Kurds, Indo Chinese, victims of religious persecution in the former Soviet Union. Bu they will reduce overall US admissions, and they will likely impede America’s ability to enlist greater international cooperation in other crises.
2. All their US leadership evidence is at least 10 years old and is assumptive of a time when the United States still retained great credibility and influence in the world—since then, we invaded Iraq, tortured some people, and refused to ratify things like Kyoto—the world no longer looks to the United States for leadership on such issues.
<also, insert soft power alternate causality cards>
3. Malignant effects of camps on host countries makes resentment inevitable
Feldman ‘7 (Sara J., Migration and Refugee Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Development Assisted Integration,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, VOLUME X X I I – 2 0 0 7)
Refugee camps also have a number of negative effects on the host governments that house them. Since they are expensive to build and maintain and are usually destroyed after the refugees leave, camps are a waste of scarce international aid. With respect to security, camps have, in a few instances, become bases for military opposition activity and enclaves of political ferment, though usually only if the refugees’ home country has a history of conflict with the host country. The maintenance of camps also places a financial and political burden on host states, a burden that is not adequately shouldered by the international community once the emergency phase is over.
4. Camps fail—refugees are left unable to rejoin the economy or farm—this makes resentment inevitable
Feldman ‘7 (Sara J., Migration and Refugee Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Development Assisted Integration,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, VOLUME X X I I – 2 0 0 7)
Many refugees in camps are severely limited in their ability to move freely in and out of the camp, especially to travel longer distances. Camp populations are often isolated from economic opportunities and dependent upon humanitarian aid for survival. This can have drastic consequences, and can lead to hunger and malnutrition from shortages in needed supplies once the emergency phase of the crisis has ended. In the early stages of a refugee emergency, basic supplies and services are usually plentiful, or at least sufficient to meet the refugees’ needs. However, after the emergency phase of a refugee situation is over, humanitarian aid often drops off significantly. Since refugee assistance donations are voluntary in the UN system, the less visible situations naturally receive less assistance. The restriction on movement also keeps refugees from responding to the pull of the labor market on a national scale, preventing those with demanded skills from migrating to areas of the country where they would best be able to employ them while contributing to the local economy.15 As camps are often allocated the least productive land and are located far from centers of economic activity, opportunities for generating income or sustaining oneself without traveling some distance can be quite limited.
5. Political factors involving host countries make success of camps impossible—this extends refugee presence
Feldman ‘7 (Sara J., Migration and Refugee Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Development Assisted Integration,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, VOLUME X X I I – 2 0 0 7)
Despite UNHCR’s apparent financial investment in and commitment to host country integration programs, which sought refugee self-sufficiency in the 1960s and 1970s, this effort was largely unsuccessful. Most organized settlements were unable to achieve or sustain economic self-sufficiency, and most refugees were not integrated into their host countries. According to Barry Stein, the most significant obstacles to their success have been “political factors involving the host country’s view of refugee settlements which impede the achievement of self-sufficiency, make it difficult to maintain if it is achieved, and which prevent the refugees’ political and social integration into the host country.”45 Of the 117 settlements established in Africa between 1961 and 1979, 85 were still operating by 1982. Of those that were no longer operating, 21 were closed due to repatriation (with 7 being declared selfsufficient before being closed) and 11 were abandoned. Of the 85 still operating, 30 had been declared self-sufficient, 21 of which had received renewed aid, while 55 were not declared self-sufficient by 1982.46